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Overview
The three-day conference opened in the afternoon of July, 5 and, after taking a quick look
at the programme and the names of the important thinkers standing out on it, one could have
expected to find a crowded audience room. Actually that was not quite the case.
What I could afford to follow and am going to write about here is only the first day of the
conference. The debate started right on time, after a short introduction given by Gabriele
Galluzzo, both organizer of the conference and member of the scientific board. I would ac-
tually like to underline the word debate: each speech (about 40 minutes) was immediately
followed by a short discussion of the issues introduced by the proponent. Unfortunately, de-
spite of the accurate and punctual speeches, the little time dedicated to each is what most
penalized the conference, in my opinion: this inevitably obliged both the speakers and the
audience to be plunged in medias res, without standing too much on ceremonies.
I take this to be ‘penalizing’, considering the debate on universals is a very wide one and
composed by an incredibly great number of positions which can sometimes start from oppo-
site sides and some other times depart at some specific middle point of one single theory of
properties and relations. Moreover, most (if not all) of them entail a certain number of other
metaphysical themes from which the specific problematics of universals cannot be cut off.
As Armstrong (1992) would put it: «we have here a sort of metaphysician’s paradise in
which philosophers can wander, arguing». For the sake of clearness (hopefully), I try to illus-
trate the positions of the prominent philosophers and fill in some gaps, whereas I considered
a notional and/or an explanatory content (even though sometimes blandly summarized) was
demanded.
∗Coherently with the language spoken during the conference, this paper is written in English, as requested by
the Scientific Direction of the journal.
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Michael Loux
An exercise in Constituent Ontology
The first presentation is the one by Michael Loux, professor of Philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame (IN).
The discussion is grounded on a particular ontological strategy whose efforts are those of
defining, in a prescriptive or descriptive way, the ontological structure of objects: in other
words how the parts of an object, in a loose, though non-mereological sense, constitute the
object itself and, of course, the question falls back to which of those parts and which of those
fundamental relations should be taken into consideration as constituents, modelling the ob-
jects of reality.
The point Loux tried to show, and which can be traced back in Loux (2005) and Loux
(2006), is that the traditional Aristotelian ontological approach, the very first theory of sub-
stance in the history of philosophy, can be certainly identified as a constituent one and, above
all, better replys to some common objections towards other contemporary constituent ap-
proaches.
The comparison starts with the consideration of the traditional bundle theory (here as
BT) which acknowledges familiar particulars to be constituted simply by bundles of proper-
ties and relations between them, without any inherence to a substance that’s separated from
them and which is supposed to bear those properties.1
This particular constituent approach, that was historically intended to avoid the impli-
cation of metaphysical obscure entities like “substances”, eventually leads to some common
objections and the following are those exemplified by Loux:
1. BT entails the Identity of Indiscernibles,2 which has been proved to be problematical, if
not false;3
2. BT entails an extreme form of essentialism, first and foremost since constituency is
recognized in all of the properties that compose a particular object and, secondly, for the
same reason
3. BT supporters could be in trouble if they are to explain how things persist through
change;
4. Since Bundle theorists acknowledge only properties in their base ontology, they’re sup-
posed to give an explanation about concrete particulars (that is, bundles of properties)
which possess those properties, that is, how properties are put and kept together to
constitute such objects.
Loux showed how different responses have been given to such objections, resulting in dif-
ferent constituent approaches, some of which step out of BT. For example, within an ante rem
view of universals, some realists’ efforts, both supporting BT and acknowledging properties
as universals, fall back to the necessity of defining a ‘property–bearer’ – resulting from a hy-
pothetical ‘suspension’ of the entire set of properties which constitute a concrete particular4
– whose function is also that of granting the identity of an object through time. But this cer-
tainly recalls the problematics entailed by the notion of “substance” and, above all, somehow
demonstrates the incompatibility of BT with realism.
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On the other hand, from a nominalist point of view, there are those who bring the ap-
proach of BT to extreme consequences, enriching it with the theory of tropes;5 in such a case,
we recognize properties not as universals but as post rem «abstract particulars»6 themselves,
which are kept together by a certain relation7 to form bundles of tropes, thus exemplified by
particular concrete objects. Nevertheless, this approach doesn’t seem to give a good response
to objections concerning essentialism and the problematics of concretizing abstract entities,
in terms of selection of properties and relations which come and constitute a concrete partic-
ular that’s predicated to be ‘such and such’.
For these and other problems (and possible solutions that Loux doesn’t seem to support),
Loux thus suggests to rehabilitate the Aristotelian approach which seems to be more success-
ful, supporting a sort of in re conception of universals.
In terms of universals and concrete particulars, the base of the Aristotelian constituent
strategy Loux traces within Aristotle’s work is defined by the two traditional kinds of acciden-
tal composites, both of which are predicative structures referring to the distinction of subject
and predicate:8
1. the first kind comprehends matter and the substantial form (the constituting universal)
predicated of it which result in the definition of familiar substance-kinds (e.g. horses,
human beings, . . . ); that is, there is something material which is subject to something
else that occurs to it, resulting in this or that family of individuals, endowed with those
properties pertaining to it.
2. the second kind entails the first and can be linked to the category of accidentals: the
product of such a concatenation is what Aristotle calls «coincidentals» (e.g. ‘the musical
man’, in which ’man’ is the constituent substance to which ’musical’, an appropriate
accidental constituent, inheres).9
The constituent character of Aristotle’s theory can be rightly pinpointed thanks to the
accidental character of both kinds of predications, the constituents can exist without neces-
sarily constituting the whole and the only form of essentialism we can derive from this theory,
according to Loux, is a weak one.
On behalf of this and the problems of identity, in the one case, the contingent mark of
some prime matter constituent being characterized in a way or another by the constituing
universal (thus defining a particular kind of substances) is what grants the existence of this
or that universal, that is, iff exemplified by this or that particular group of existing individ-
uals (here stands the appeal to in re universals). Moreover, once we join this to the second
kind of composition, this or that particular individual (i.e. substance of a certain kind) is also
subject to the contingent predication of being accidentally ‘such and such’.
The appeal to this weak use of the notion of “substance” as defined within “kinds” is also
what both explains the persistence of an object through change at the variation of accidental
properties (and, in this passage, Loux refers to the second kind of composites, since a sub-
stance, although primarily determined contingently, cannot change its kind) and justifies the
appeal to the particular Principle of Constituent Identity (read note 2) without involving con-
tradictory cases of the sort of numerically distinct individuals which have all their properties
in common.
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Peter van Inwagen
Relational versus Constituent Ontologies
Peter van Inwagen, professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, is the second
proponent. In response to the presentation of the constituent approach, Van Inwagen intro-
duced the opposite kind of ontological strategy, namely, the relational one.
Particularly, such an approach sets out a specific goal that is the consideration and indi-
viduation of the relation that holds between ordinary objects and their properties, without
acknowledging constituency for such properties and relations.
To give an example of the aforementioned definition, we could consider the sentence: “The
apple is green”. which constituent ontologists would interpret as expressing that ‘being green’
is a property had by the apple (entailing the debates and theories whose goal is that of charac-
terizing that “had by”, considered as a constituent relation in some non-mereological sense),
while relational ontologists would consider ‘being green’ (or the colour green) as a sort of sub-
part of that particular object which merely composes it, entertaining particular relations with
other parts and the final concrete object itself. Another example Van Inwagen provides is that
of a clock which is composed by a certain number of finite objectual parts related in a certain
way to one another. In other words, this or that particular whole coincides with the sum of
its parts or features and the further organization of these that is recognized and predicated
of those parts in terms of properties and relations.
Properties and relations which are to be intended, according to him, as included within
the specific category of abstract entities, abstract as much as the predication of an object to
be ‘such and such’. Such a view is, ammittedly, defined as a nominalist one, in the case of
Van Inwagen. He himself, both during the presentation and, for example, in van Inwagen
(2004),10 claims to hold to a nominalist position on properties, conceived as belonging to the
specific ontological category of abstract entities, even though in a very particular way.
More specifically, properties are what Van Inwagen refers to as assertibles of this or that
thing and which, for this reason, cannot certainly be constitutive of an object but, on the con-
trary, in a particular instantiation relation to it. Moreover, properties can be seen literally
as blobs11 without a structure, that is to say, since our predication of an object to be ‘such
and such’ corresponds to an external relation we instantiate between that object and what is
predicated of it, we have literally no direct access to what could be defined as a “constituent”
of it, we simply relate to it by predication, be it ordinary, rigorously scientific or even con-
tradictory. Hence here can be seen the character of necessity of the existence of properties
Van Inwagen supports, since properties are those ordinary objects we relate to, as well as the
complete lack of necessity for estamblishing a constituency relation and/or characterization
to what is predicated of an object, hence resulting in unstructured blobs.
Besides of that, Van Inwagen’s intent is to show arguments (common-sense counter argu-
mentations, in reality) for preferring the relational approach instead of the constituent one
and, particularly, for repudiating the idea of “ontological structure”. For example, to sup-
port Van Inwagen’s base hypotheses could entail the support of the theory of tropes. But this
would not only result in a methodological mistake (i.e. falling back to a constituent approach),
but also in a categorial mistake.
Let us consider the property: “having a diameter of 10 centimeters” and let us suppose
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that two distinct objects have that property; if tropes are to be considered as abstract partic-
ulars, each object will have its own property of “having a diameter of 10 centimeters” and we
are committed to admitting at the same time that the general property is one, although had
in two different ways (i.e. within two different objects). But, apart from such problematics,
according to Van Inwagen, we would in no way mean that there are two ways of having a
diameter of 10 centimeters, but in reality that the diameter of both objects is the same. And
that is what we instantiate externally from the two ‘actual’ objects, this is an abstract exter-
nal correlation that we perform (naturally not in a psychological-conceptual sense).
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Dean Zimmerman
Rehabilitating David Lewis’s Argument from Temporary Intrinsics
The third presentation focuses on a specific problem and somehow detaches from the meta-
ontological debate pertaining to the methods of approaching “what there is”. Dean Zimmer-
man, professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University (NJ), actually discusses and intends to
show the position Lewis (1986) holds in On the Plurality of Worlds, particularly on behalf
of the problematics of temporary intrinsics12 and the persistence of an object through time,
though reconsidering it from a presentist point of view.
Zimmerman first supplies what can be defined as a standard distinction between two
metaphysical theories of time, as they were identified by McTaggart (1908):
A-theory: There are objective distinctions between what is present, what is past and
what is future. In order to give a complete account of time, one should appeal
to A-properties: “being present”, “being past” and “being future” (i.e. a ‘tensed’
conception of time).
B-theory: There are just relative distinctions between past, present and future. What
can be actually said of time must be expressed in terms of temporal relations,
namely, B-relations: “being earlier than”, “being later than”, “being simulta-
neous with” (i.e. an ‘untensed’ conception of time).
A presentist A-theory, a tensed theory which acknowledges only present entities as exist-
ing, is what Zimmerman defends and he supports it by showing that Lewis’s perdurantist
argument of temporary intrinsics and temporal parts actually does not directly commit a
philosopher either to reject presentism or to reject endurantism, as Lewis holds.13 In fact, it
still holds A-theory (but also B-theory) at least as possible.
Lewis’s temporary intrinsics could be explained as follows: whenever we associate a prop-
erty to an object – for example: “X is now sitting” – that marks a change from a supposed
previous physical «shape» ‘X’ had – like: “X is now standing up” – we are talking about an
intrinsic property pertaining to a temporal part of that object that has changed. Intrinsic,
Zimmerman explains, in two different senses:
1. such property is had by that object and does in no way entail an external relation what-
soever (as, for example, in “being at a distance of n meters from ...”). It is a monadic
property;
2. such property is naturally had by that object, that is to say that natural properties are
those to be held responsible for the cases of fundamental resemblance of an object to
another.
So, individuals are made up of temporal parts and temporary intrinsics are properties
of these parts. Temporary, since such properties change through time. Hence, according to
Lewis, the only way we can conceive of things as changing is by holding to a perdurantist
position.
Basically, if (2) were not contemplated within the definition of ‘intrinsic’, there would be no
chance of considering resemblance as granting some sort of objectual continuity. Zimmerman
seems to go on on this line and puts more meat on the grill by assuming that fundamental
intrinsics wouldn’t certainly be acknoledgeable as ‘fundamental’ if they were not responsible
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for the causal regularities we observe, so it should be advisable that fundamental intrinsics
were considered as properties which cause a certain kind of basic interaction with other ob-
jects (not only concerning different objects present in different places, but also objects, or the
same object [and this is the case], present at different times).
If this assumption is held to be true, then:
1. we could still wonder whether the objects that have such intrinsics are:
a1 short-lived, hence their intrinsic properties are simple and imply uniformity in the
causal powers of the objects that have them;
b1 long-lived, hence their intrinsic properties are complex and imply different causal
behaviours at different times.
2. then a would entail two possible consequences:
a2 it is (short-lived) temporal parts that have such intrinsics (and this is compatible
with Lewis’s view of acknowledging the existence of temporal parts);
b2 it is a combination of ‘an enduring object’ plus ‘a brief space-time region’ that have
such intrinsics (and this is the identification of an enduring slice of space-time).
Hence:
3. If b1 is true, a presentist A-theory is false, but then fundamental intrinsics would not be
causally fundamental at all. But this contradicts the primary assumption, so trivially
A-theory is true (and from this point, Zimmerman derives whatever else he can derive).
4. From 2 and 3, either A-theory is true, or a2 is true, or b2 is true.
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Notes
1The birth of this theory can be dated back to Hume (1739-1740) who refused the notion of “substance”, also in
response to Locke (1690) and his definition of a bare substratum as «a supposed, I know not what, to support those
ideas, we call accidents [...]».
2In this case, since BT is a constituent approach, it entails the Principle of Constituent Identity: if any two objects
are made of all the same constituent parts, they are the same object.
3For example, Black (1952) raises a counterexample in terms of objects as being numerically distinct although
having the same ‘qualifing’ properties.
4And in such cases we have the recognition of what Russell (1912b) called «bare particulars».
5See Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990)
6See Campbell (1990). Here ‘abstract’ shouldn’t be strictly intended as an ontological category but more as cate-
gory of language, coherently with the nominalistic assumption. Tropes have nevertheless been defined in a multitude
of ways and this is one of the reasons Loux doesn’t seem to be at ease with the theory of tropes, namely, because of
the problems concerning the individuation of a trope. Read more: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/.
7Some ontologists would refer to a relation of compresence, but there are multiple solutions and points of view.
8Aristotle (3b)
9See also (Loux, 2006, pp. 212–213)
10In this essay Van Inwagen argues for a sort of indispensability argument concerning properties, resembling the
one by Putnam and Quine for mathematical realism [Putnam (1971)].
11See (Armstrong, 1989a, p. 66)
12(Lewis, 1986, pp. 198–209).
13(Lewis, 1986, p. 204).
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